EAllusion: the potential person

[_sock puppet]

So as not to hijack another thread in progress, I start this thread to ask EAllusion about his reference in the context of Down Syndrome abortions to a fetus as "the potential person".

Personhood vel non is the end result of most analyses regarding abortion. That is, those that usually end up with abortion being up to the woman usually have concluded that prior to live birth, or prior to reaching a stage of gestation where the fetus would have viability outside the womb, the fetus is not a 'person'. On the other hand, those that usually side against abortion either from the moment of conception or when there are observable brain waves from an EEG or the fetus makes any observable autonomous movement, deem the fetus a 'person' from that moment.

EAllusion, I found your use of the term 'potential person' to refer to the fetus as an interesting and thought provoking one. Would you expound?

[_EAllusion]

Abortions of fetuses with down syndrome typically occur early enough that they are unlikely to have had the level of brain development I think matters for having the mental qualities necessary for me to consider something a person. I think the personhood debate is a complicated one, but of the views that I think are plausible, none would bestow personhood on a organism with early stage brain development. As for the view that I'd tentatively most likely defend, I look to the capacity to have conscious experience of desire and a retrievable enduring sense of self. The latter is important for distinguishing between the brain dead (not a person) and a person who is comatose but could come out of it (a person). But I have no hard committment to that position. I can't tell you when cold becomes hot but I can say that -40 F is cold and much in the same way I'm highly confident in a blastocyst, for instance, not being a person.

Regarding your point, I don't think it's functional brain waves that pro-lifers are looking at regarding personhood. Fish have brainwaves, and I don't take most pro-lifers for being hardcore vegan animal rights activists. Rather, what they are typically looking at is either 1) an organism is a person if it is somehow ensouled or 2) an organism is a person if it has the potential to develop into a functional human.

[_sock puppet]

Abortions of fetuses with down syndrome typically occur early enough that they are unlikely to have had the level of brain development I think matters for having the mental qualities necessary for me to consider something a person. I think the personhood debate is a complicated one, but of the views that I think are plausible, none would bestow personhood on a organism with early stage brain development. As for the view that I'd tentatively most likely defend, I look to the capacity to have conscious experience of desire and a retrievable enduring sense of self. The latter is important for distinguishing between the brain dead (not a person) and a person who is comatose but could come out of it (a person). But I have no hard committment to that position. I can't tell you when cold becomes hot but I can say that -40 F is cold and much in the same way I'm highly confident in a blastocyst, for instance, not being a person.

Regarding your point, I don't think it's functional brain waves that pro-lifers are looking at regarding personhood. Fish have brainwaves, and I don't take most pro-lifers for being hardcore vegan animal rights activists. Rather, what they are typically looking at is either 1) an organism is a person if it is somehow ensouled or 2) an organism is a person if it has the potential to develop into a functional human.

Thanks, EAllusion. I have underlined two parts of your answer I'd like to probe a bit more.

Could you be more specific at what stage from post-blastocyst to live birth that you might assign someone as having that capability you describe in the first underlined part?

As for someone that is 'brain dead' not being a person, do you think that such an organism should yet have any legal rights?

[_EAllusion]

Could you be more specific at what stage from post-blastocyst to live birth that you might assign someone as having that capability you describe in the first underlined part?

Developmental biology/cognitive psych hasn't progressed to the point that you can pinpoint it. But such traits require are related to a functional neocortex, and we know an organism that lacks a rudimentaryly developed telencephalon doesn't have that.

[Edit: Being self-consciously cautious, I look around the second trimester. It's improtant to remember that these traits down turn on like a light switch, but rather are part of a gradual process of development. Pete Singer infamously and persuasively argues that newborns are still lacking, which leads him to endorse infanticide in certain instances.]

As for someone that is 'brain dead' not being a person, do you think that such an organism should yet have any legal rights?

No. When you are brain dead, you are dead. You no longer exist. I do, however, believe in wills and I think your dead body is part of your estate. Conseqeuntly, I believe your body falls within your general estate property rights. But I don't think there should be a legal obligation against people pulling the plug on your brain dead body if you aren't funding its maintainence. As far as I know, this is the way the law is written where I am.

[_EAllusion]

Of course it is important to establish that a brain dead person is, in fact, brain dead. I'm not advocating against caution. I'm saying a person is no longer a person in a moral and legal sense without a functioning brain.

[_sock puppet]

Could you be more specific at what stage from post-blastocyst to live birth that you might assign someone as having that capability you describe in the first underlined part?

Developmental biology/cognitive psych hasn't progressed to the point that you can pinpoint it. But such traits require are related to a functional neocortex, and we know an organism that lacks a rudimentaryly developed telencephalon doesn't have that.

Again, thank you. Is there a time range, if not a pinpoint in time, when a fetus has a neocortex that begins functioning in the way you describe?

[_EAllusion]

Again, thank you. Is there a time range, if not a pinpoint in time, when a fetus has a neocortex that begins functioning in the way you describe?

Probably between early third trimester and early infanthood. The evidence that is in suggests it doesn't really start to come "online" until around full-term. And that's the begining. My stated position is a cautious one that tries to take into account both the falliblity of biology and of philosophical considerations. But caution has limits, and I'm not in favor of respecting blastocysts as persons anymore than I would sponges. I also have no problem calling an early fetus a "potential person" like I did in the post that started this thread.

[_sock puppet]

Again, thank you. Is there a time range, if not a pinpoint in time, when a fetus has a neocortex that begins functioning in the way you describe?

Probably between early third trimester and early infanthood. The evidence that is in suggests it doesn't really start to come "online" until around full-term. And that's the begining. My stated position is a cautious one that tries to take into account both the falliblity of biology and of philosophical considerations. But caution has limits, and I'm not in favor of respecting blastocysts as persons anymore than I would sponges. I also have no problem calling an early fetus a "potential person" like I did in the post that started this thread.

So, in trying to ascertain a time frame, it seems you would put the earliest onset of the neocortex brain function you describe for personhood at around three months into the gestation. Prior to that you do not ascribe personhood, just potential personhood, to a fetus?

[_EAllusion]

So, in trying to ascertain a time frame, it seems you would put the earliest onset of the neocortex brain function you describe for personhood at around three months into the gestation. Prior to that you do not ascribe personhood, just potential personhood, to a fetus?

6 months is more reasonable. But yeah, I do not ascribe personhood to a fetus that is only 3 months old.

[_sock puppet]

Thanks, EAllusion to responding to my drill downs. I think I know where you are coming from now on this. In case you did not know, your approach roughly equates to that taken by the U.S. Supreme Court.